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NOTES
AFTER NA TWEST: ARE CAMP "SUBTLE
HAZARDS" AND "UNION OF POWERS"
ANALYSES DEAD?
Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall or the Act)' in
the wake of the 1929 stock market crash to restore public confidence in the
banking system. 2 The Act prohibits commercial bank involvement in cer-
tain types of investment banking activities3 and prohibits the involvement of
securities firms in commercial banking.4 The Act also prohibits a bank affili-
ate's5 involvement in certain investment banking activities,6 but limits this
latter prohibition to affiliations with entities "principally engaged" in the
prohibited activities.7 Finally, the Act prohibits corporate director inter-
locks between corporations "primarily engaged" in certain investment bank-
ing activities and member banks.8
This wall between commercial and investment banking has recently come
1. The Glass-Steagall Act refers to §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, ch.
89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh), 78, 377, 378 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)).
2. See 75 CONG. REC. 3962, 3963 (1932).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 16 prohibits member com-
mercial banks from buying or selling securities "solely upon the order, and for the account of,
customers." Id.
4. Id. § 378. Section 21 prohibits investment banking firms, underwriters or brokerage
houses from accepting deposits or otherwise engaging in commercial banking. Id.
5. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 58
(1981).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). "[C]ommercial banks and their affiliates"
handled 61% of "new bond issue participations" in 1930. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial
and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 495 (1971). The failure of the
Bank of the United States in 1930, the largest bank failure in United States history up to that
time, involved bank affiliates and investment banking activities. Id. at 496-97. Until recently,
most authorities agreed that the statutory framework of the Glass-Steagall Act assumed the
necessity for a "divorce" of commercial from investment banking. Investment Co. Inst., 450
U.S. at 70. But see Golembe, The Glass-Steagall Act-Friend or Foe?, 1987-2 GOLEMBE REP.
3.
7. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 20 prohibits the affiliation between a
commercial member bank and a business "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, under-
writing, public sale, or distribution ... of ... securities." Id. (emphasis added).
8. Id. § 78; see also id. § 377. Section 32 prohibits corporate interlocks between com-
mercial banks and organizations "primarily engaged" in § 20 activities. Id.
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under fire as the financial markets invent financing instruments never con-
templated by the Congress in 19339 and many commercial banks express
concerns about their competitiveness with securities firms within the con-
straints of Glass-Steagall. " As banks have gained momentum in their push
for banking reform, members of Congress have responded with a legislative
proposal to break down the Glass-Steagall wall between commercial and in-
vestment banking.1' Although the stock market tail spin of "Black Mon-
day" temporarily may have dampened legislative efforts to repeal Glass-
Steagall,"2 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Board), and the
federal courts continue to narrow the scope of Glass-Steagall. 13 However,
this narrowing potentially undermines the condition upon which the courts
first agreed to defer to agency regulation. Historically, the courts have de-
9. Golembe, supra note 6, at 15.
10. "In addition, introduction of new financial instruments and the globalization of
money in the past five years have made it possible for a small amount of money to produce
large market swings worldwide." Sherer, Market Swings Worry Investors, Christian Science
Monitor, Oct. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 2; see also D. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, statement before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance,
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 5, 1987) (unpublished transcript).
11. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., DISCUSSION DRAFT, THE FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1987 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter DRAFT FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT]. The Senate Banking Committee approved the
bill on an 18 to 2 vote. Bill Passed by Senate Panel Would Expand Banks' Powers, Wash. Post,
Mar. 4, 1988, at B3, col. 2. However, the bill's disposition in the House is less certain. Key to
Bank Deregulation: Dingell's Help, Long-Time Foe Now Seen as Possible Limited Backer,
Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1988, at HI, col. 3; Aide: Dingell Stands Firm Against Underwriting,
Am. Banker, Mar. 8, 1988, at 9, col. 2.
12. Articles in various national newspapers reported renewed reservations in Congress for
the rolling back of Glass-Steagall. Day, Collapse Threatens Bank Bill, Wash. Post, Oct. 25,
1987, at HI, col. 5; Bradley, Banks in No Danger But Their Push For New Powers May Be,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 21, 1987, at 32, col. 4; Ricks & Langley, Congress Puts on Fast
Track Regulations for Wall Street, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1987, at 27, col. 1. Ironically, Conti-
nental Illinois National Bank & Trust "[v]iolated federal banking rules ... [during the October
1987 stock market crash] . . .when it bailed out a subsidiary that was itself close to failure
because of losses from the stock market's plunge." Day, Regulators Say Bank Broke Rules,
Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1987, at Bl, col. 1.
13. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall act permits the private placement of commercial pa-
per by a bank. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bank-
ers Trust II), 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. June 22,
1987); A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 519 F. Supp. 602
(D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984), later proceeding, 627 F.
Supp. 695 (D.D.C. 1986). However, the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 imposed a
moratorium from March 6, 1987 through March 1, 1988 that prohibits the Board from ap-
proving any bank holding company or affiliate involvement in activities regulated by § 20 of
the Act during the moratorium period. Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 201, 101 Stat. 552, 584 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841).
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ferred to agency determinations involving Glass-Steagall activities. 4 The
courts have based this deference on an implicit view that Glass-Steagall
serves both a prohibitory and a regulatory function. 5 The courts have rec-
ognized the agency's superior ability to protect against the express hazards
inherent in investment banking activities as well as the subtle hazards Con-
gress sought to avoid.' 6
In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System (NatWest), 7 however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit deviated from the Supreme Court's prece-
dents when it attempted to demonstrate the superfluity of subtle hazards
analysis in cases where the Board determines that the applicable Glass-Stea-
gall Act provisions do not expressly prohibit the proposed activity.' 8 This
rationale limits the scope of prohibited activities to those expressly identified
in the Glass-Steagall Act which Congress enacted over fifty years ago,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's encapsulation of the legislative history
of the Glass-Steagall Act under the rubric of hazards and subtle hazards.
Natwest construes section 20 of the Act to prohibit bank affiliates only from
engaging principally in the underwriting of securities. 9 In strictly constru-
ing section 20, the court ignored the possibility that the combination of ac-
tivities covered by the NatWest application would fail to satisfy section 20 if
the subsidiary's activities were examined under the "subtle hazards" test.2°
The NatWest court argued that an activity "closely related" to banking, be-
cause it is a traditional fiduciary function of bank trust departments, cannot
implicate any subtle hazards.2 '
This Note will review the case law preceding the NatWest decision which
established the subtle hazards analysis for Glass-Steagall cases. It will assess
the analytical success of the NatWest court's attempt to justify substantial
deference to agency decisions in Glass-Steagall cases under a standard that
diminishes the importance of subtle hazards. This Note will conclude that
the standard adopted in NatWest undermines prior Supreme Court use of
subtle hazards analysis to expand the Act into a regulatory context at the
same time that Congress considers incorporating a regulatory approach into
its proposals to reform Glass-Steagall.
14. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-29 (1971).
15. See infra notes 23, 56, 64-75, 97-108, and accompanying text.
16. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630-35.
17. 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988)
(No. 87-562).
18. Id. at 813-17 & n.8.
19. Id. at 813-14.
20. Id. at 813-17.
21. Id. at 817.
19881
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I. REGULATORY APPLICATION OF GLASS-STEAGALL
A. The Subtle Hazards of Glass-Steagall, Union of Powers, and Deference
to Administrative Regulation
The Supreme Court, in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 22 first ar-
ticulated the principle that the great weight normally given to "any reason-
able construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with
the enforcement of that statute" should be rejected when that agency fails to
"search for the meaning and intent of Congress.",23 The Court refused to
defer substantially to a regulation involving sections 1624 and 2125 of the
Glass-Steagall Act which the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the
OCC) promulgated without any accompanying rationale as to the meaning
and intent of Congress.26 The Court independently examined the legislative
history using subtle hazards analysis as a conceptual framework to articulate
the congressional concerns behind the Act. 7 In doing so, the court defined
the parameters of agency discretion by isolating the hazards and subtle
hazards of investment banking that Congress sought to avoid in commercial
banking. 28 These subtle hazards focused upon conflict of interest and un-
sound banking practices which the public and Congress had linked to the
1929 crash.29
The "principal hazard" Congress originally sought to avert by enacting
the Glass-Steagall Act consisted of the "obvious danger that a bank might
invest its own assets in... imprudent" securities3a Upon a thorough review
of the legislative history, the Supreme Court identified other "subtle
hazards"3 Congress had sought to avoid by erecting a wall between com-
mercial banking and investment banking. These subtle hazards include: (1)
the impairment of public confidence in the bank, essential to its solvency,
when its securities affiliate fared badly;32 (2) the "temptation to shore up the
affiliate through unsound loans or other aid";33 (3) "the pressure to sell a
particular investment and to make the affiliate successful [creating] a risk
22. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
23. Id. at 627-28.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
25. Id. § 378.
26. Camp, 401 U.S. at 627.
27. Id. at 627-34.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 630.
31. Id. at 630-35.
32. Id. at 631 (citing Hearings on S. Re& 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comn. on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 20, 237, 1063 (1931)).
33. Id.
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that the bank would make its credit facilities more freely available" or
"make unsound loans... [to] companies in whose ... securities the affiliate
has invested";34 (4) the chance that "bank depositors might suffer losses on
investments they purchased in reliance on the relationship between the bank
and its affiliate";" (5) the temptation "to make loans to customers with the
expectation that the loan would facilitate the purchase of stocks and securi-
ties"; 36 (6) "the conflict between the promotional interest of the investment
banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested
investment advice.",37 The Camp Court articulated these examples of subtle
hazards under the broader subtle hazard that "the promotional needs of in-
vestment banking might lead commercial banks to lend their reputation for
prudence and restraint to the enterprise of selling particular stocks and
securities.""8
In light of this intent, the Court held that the OCC regulation's authoriza-
tion of commercial bank sponsorship of a commingled managing agency ac-
count or mutual fund39 violated sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall. ° The
Court reasoned that the activity implicated some of the hazards and subtle
hazards of investment banking that Congress intended to prevent by enact-
ing Glass-Steagall." Although the pertinent statutory provisions did not ex-
pressly prohibit bank sponsorship of mutual funds, the Court concluded that
efforts to sell participation in such a fund constituted sale of a security
within the purview of Glass-Steagall. 2
The Camp Court premised its subtle hazards analysis on union of powers
analysis when it recognized that activities that individually raise no hazards
34. Id. (citing Hearings on S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 20, 237, 1063 (1931)).
35. Id. (citing 77 CONG. REC. 4028 (1931) (statement of Rep. Fish)).
36. Id. at 632 (citing S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1931)).
37. Id. at 633 (citing 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1931) (statement of Sen. Bulkley)).
38. Id. at 632 (citing 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1931) (statement of Sen. Bulkley)).
39. The Court defined a mutual fund as an open-end investment company. Id. at 625
n.l1.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines an investment company as an "issuer"
of "any security" which "is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily ... in the
business of investing ... in securities .. " 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(21), 80a-3(a)(1).
An open-end company is one "which is offering for sale or has outstanding any re-
deemable security of which it is the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1). An investment
company also includes a "unit investment trust": an investment company which,
among other things, "is organized under a ... contract of ... agency ... and ...
issues only redeemable securities, each of which represents an undivided interest in a
unit of specified securities ...." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2).
Id.
40. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh), 378 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
41. Camp, 401 U.S. at 636-38.
42. Id. at 634-38.
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of investment banking could violate Glass-Steagall precepts when combined.
The Court applied its union of powers analysis to prohibit bank sponsorship
of the commingled managing agency account. The Court reasoned that,
although the commingled managing agency accounts consisted of two sepa-
rate, permissible components--commingled trust funds and the bank acting
as managing agent-the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited their joinder in the
operation of the fund.43 The Court stated that this union of powers gave
"birth to an investment fund whose activities [were] of a different charac-
ter,"" "in direct competition with the mutual fund industry."45 This activ-
ity, tantamount to operation of a mutual fund, essentially required the bank
to act as investment advisor to an open-end investment company. The com-
bination of sale of commercial trust funds with a managing agent power
implicated the subtle hazards of investment banking even though neither of
the individual services would do so. Thus, an activity not expressly prohib-
ited by the literal language of the Glass-Steagall Act implicated subtle
hazards and required regulation or prohibition.
B. The Subtle Hazards of Investment Advisory Services Within the
Framework of the Bank Holding Company Act
The Camp Court introduced the union of powers framework for subtle
hazards analysis in circumstances involving bank powers under the Glass-
Steagall Act. However, the statutory structure of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 (BHCA)46 expressly incorporated an analogous frame-
43. Id. at 624-25.
44. Id.
45. Id. The dissent in Camp completely rejected the "union of powers" framework for
subtle hazards analysis, along with subtle hazards analysis itself. It argued that Glass-Steagall
prohibited commercial bank involvement in investment banking; the commingled managing
agency account constituted a "traditional fiduciary function" of bank trust departments.
Therefore, the consideration of subtle hazards erroneously extended the scope of Glass-Stea-
gall prohibitions to traditional commercial bank functions Congress never intended to pro-
hibit. Id. at 643-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). The differing treatment of banks and bank affiliates
afforded by the Glass-Steagall Act further clarifies the relationship between the BHCA and the
Glass-Steagall Act. For example, § 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which pertains to banks,
prohibits banks from engaging in underwriting. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986); see also Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S.
46, 58-59 & n.24 (1981). In contrast, § 20 of the Act, pertaining to "affiliates," prohibits these
bank affiliates from being "engaged principally" in underwriting. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). The qualified nature of the prohibition against bank affiliate underwriting in
the Glass-Steagall Act partially explains the need for the BHCA: "Part of the motivation
underlying the requirement that bank holding companies divest themselves of nonbanking in-
terests was the desire to provide a measure of regulation missing from the Glass-Steagall Act."
Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 69. However, this intent behind the BHCA cannot at all be
construed to limit the "engaged principally" qualification against prohibition in § 20 of the
[Vol. 37:791
"Subtle Hazards" and "Union of Powers"
work for regulating bank holding companies. For example, Congress
intended the BHCA "to maintain and.., strengthen Glass-Steagall's restric-
tions on the relationship between commercial and investment banking."47
Although the BHCA generally seeks to limit banks to banking and to keep
banks separate from commercial businesses,48 section 4(c)(8) 49 constitutes
an exception to this overall purpose. This provision permits bank holding
companies to hold shares of any company engaged in activities that the
Board determines are (1) closely related to banking and (2) "a proper inci-
dent thereto."50 The two tests are independently and conjunctively applied:
an activity closely related to banking may not necessarily constitute a proper
incident to banking. Thus, Federal Reserve Board determinations of
whether an activity "closely related to banking" also constitutes a "proper
incident thereto" requires consideration of whether the risks of unsound
banking practices outweigh the activity's "benefits to the public."'"
Consideration of unsound banking practices necessarily includes a consid-
eration of Glass-Steagall policies. Thus, in Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, 2 the Supreme Court ex-
pressly incorporated the subtle hazards analysis into the proper incident to
banking test.53 Investment Company Institute arose from a challenge to a
proposed Board regulation that allowed bank holding companies and subsid-
iaries to provide investment advisory services to closed-end investment com-
panies.5 4 The Board regulation at issue did not address investment advice to
open-end investment companies. Further, as in Camp, the express statutory
language of the Glass-Steagall Act neither prohibited nor regulated the pro-
Act. Rather, the BHCA exists in part because of the consequences of the "engaged princi-
pally" limitation of § 20. See generally id. at 69-70 (expressly rejecting the view that the
BHCA limits the engaged principally limitation of § 20, notwithstanding its overall purpose).
47. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 69; 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
48. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2482.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
50. Id. A bank holding company may acquire "shares of any company the activities of
which the Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or
regulation) to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto." Id. In determining whether an activity is a proper incident, the
Board is to "consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reason-
ably be expected to provide benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased com-
petition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue
concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or unsound
banking practices." Id.
51. Id.
52. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
53. Id. at 55-59, 64, 68.
54. Id. at 49-51; 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.25(b)(4), 225.125(c) (1987).
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vision by banks or affiliates of investment advisory services to closed-end
investment companies. Yet, the Court found that the provision of invest-
ment advisory services in both contexts implicated the subtle hazards Con-
gress sought to avoid with Glass-Steagall." However, in Investment
Company Institute, unlike Camp, the Court held regulation of these hazards
to be adequate. 6 The Court based its conclusion on three reasons.
First, there exist fewer hazards and subtle hazards associated with invest-
ment advice provided to the closed-end investment companies at issue in
Investment Company Institute as compared to the number of subtle hazards
associated with providing investment advice to open-end investment compa-
nies as in Camp.5 7 For example, the bank sponsoring the mutual fund in
Camp underwrote the stock of the open-end investment company." In con-
trast, the bank in Investment Company Institute would neither underwrite
nor sell the stock of its closed-end investment company. 9 Advisors to
closed-end investment companies managed to avoid the subtle hazards of
underwriting by not realizing an increase in their advisory fees as the result
of sales of company shares." In contrast, the fees of advisors to mutual
funds increased through the sale of company shares, providing an incentive
to the bank or its holding company to engage in promotional activities.6
Second, unlike Camp, which dealt mainly with a bank's management of
an open-end investment company under section 16 of the Glass-Steagall
Act, 62 the Court resolved Investment Company Institute in the context of a
bank holding company and a section 4(c)(8) affiliate providing investment
advisory services to a closed-end investment company under section 20 of
Glass-Steagall. 63 Whereas section 16 prohibited bank activities that impli-
cated the subtle hazards of investment banking, section 20 merely prohibited
bank holding companies and their affiliates from being principally engaged
in activities that implicated the subtle hazards of investment banking.
6 4
Thus, section 20 permitted greater involvement in investment banking activi-
ties by affiliates than section 16 allowed banks.65 Subtly hazardous activities
55. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 65-68; Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
630-32 (1971).
56. 450 U.S. at 65-68.
57. Id. at 66-67.
58. Id. at 65-66 (comparing the Investment Company Institute situation with that in
Camp).
59. Id. at 66-67.
60. Id. at 67 & n.40.
61. Id. at 67.
62. Id. at 65-68; Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625-39 (1971).
63. 450 U.S. at 48-50.
64. Id. at 60-61 & n.26.
65. Id. at 58 & n.24.
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by bank holding companies and subsidiaries appear more amenable to regu-
lation because of the principally engaged limitation of section 20, while simi-
lar activities by banks seem subject to outright prohibition. However, this
merely facilitates an overall ad hoc explanation of the outcome in Investment
Company Institute, if the analytical role of subtle hazards analysis is ignored.
The fact that Investment Company Institute was decided within a BHCA
context does not fully explain how the Court came to its decision. This is
because the fact that an entity is a bank holding company as opposed to a
bank does not aid a determination of when to regulate as opposed to when to
prohibit. Instead, subtle hazards analysis appears to have been the means by
which the Court determined when the "principally engaged" threshold was
crossed.66
Specifically, the Investment Company Institute Court limited its holding to
the proposition that the Board regulation authorizing investment advisory
services to closed-end investment companies constituted an activity closely
related to banking, because the investment advisory services constituted
"traditional fiduciary functions" of bank trust departments. 67 The Court
implicitly articulated the major premise of the Camp union of powers ap-
proach when it affirmed that traditional fiduciary functions closely related to
banking could, in fact, implicate subtle hazards when later evaluated under a
proper incident to banking analysis. 6' This independence between the
closely related to banking and proper incident to banking tests of the BHCA
logically incorporated the union of powers framework for subtle hazards
analysis into a bank holding company context. The application of subtle
hazards analysis in the bank holding company context extended court defer-
ence to the Board's regulations under section 4(c)(8) proper incident to
banking analysis.69
Third, the Court, citing Camp, deferred to the Board's interpretive ruling
on its regulation because the Board addressed the subtle hazards that Con-
gress intended to avoid with the Glass-Steagall prohibitions.7 ° For example,
the Board imposed restrictions on a bank's extension of credit to an invest-
ment company to which it provided investment advisory services.7" In addi-
tion, the Board's interpretive ruling restricted the bank from providing
depositors' names to the investment company.72 This restriction avoided the
66. Id. at 65-68.
67. Id. at 55-58.
68. Id. at 57-59.
69. Id. at 68.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 67.
72. Id. at 67 n.39.
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hazard associated with a bank failing to render impartial advice because it
promotes its fund.73 Further restrictions imposed by the Board ranged from
prohibitions on a bank acting as investment advisor to any investment com-
pany with a similar name to prohibitions against locating the investment
company offices with those of the bank in the same building.74 The Board
implemented these restrictions to prevent the public from connecting the
fortunes of the investment company with the soundness of the bank.7 5
Furthermore, the Court deferred to the Board regulations under the
BHCA as "a preliminary authorization of such services, rather than ap-
proval of any specific advisory relationship., 76 The Court expressly as-
sumed that only the first prong of the section 4(c)(8) test under the BHCA
was at issue. Under this prong, the Court held that the investment advisory
services in a closed-end investment context were closely related to banking
because they were similar to the "traditional fiduciary functions of banks."77
However, the Court explicitly left open the issue as to whether such services
would constitute a proper incident to banking under the second prong of
section 4(c)(8).7 8 In fact, the Court further premised its deference on the
assumption that the Board would continue to review specific applications
under the second prong to assure that proposed investment advisory services
within specific factual circumstances did not conflict with the policies of the
Glass-Steagall Act.79 In other words, this part of the Investment Company
Institute holding limited its deference to the proposition that the investment
advisory services at issue were closely related to banking under the first
prong. It did not presume that such activities would never fail the second
prong by violating the Glass-Steagall Act in specific situations.
C. Subtle Hazards Applied to Discount Brokerage Services Within the
Framework of the Bank Holding Company Act
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court retain the subtle hazards
framework for Glass-Steagall regulation. The Court's decision in Securities
Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Schwab) 80 accords with the subtle hazards and substantial deference frame-
work of Investment Company Institute and Camp. Schwab arose out of a
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 57-58, 64, 68.
77. Id. at 57-58.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 468 U.S. 207, 218 (1984).
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securities industry challenge to Bank America Corporation's proposed ac-
quisition of Charles Schwab & Company, a discount brokerage business."1
The Supreme Court held that section 20 of Glass-Steagall permitted the ac-
quisition because brokerage services fell outside of the definition of a public
sale of securities prohibited by section 20.82 The Court also held that bro-
kerage services alone implicated none of the subtle hazards recognized in
Camp. 8 ' The Court expressly premised its holding on the exclusion of in-
vestment advisory services from the discount brokerage services at issue.8 4
Even though the bulk of the Schwab opinion concerned the construction
of "public sale," the holding relied on both the public sale analysis and the
subtle hazards analysis. In the public sale analysis, the Court construed
public sale as underwriting and not as encompassing the discount brokerage
services at issue.8 5 In fact, the Court limited the meaning of all of the terms
of prohibition in section 20 to underwriting for the purposes of deciding the
facts of the case. Both the public sale analysis and subtle hazards analysis
gave independent support to the holding.86 Thus, the Court's determination
that the acquisition implicated none of the subtle hazards had little to do
with the meaning of public sale under section 20. Rather, the Court rea-
soned that discount brokerage services did not implicate any of the subtle
hazards of underwriting because of the nature of each service.8 7 For exam-
ple, the profits for discount brokerage services depended exclusively on the
volume of shares rather than the sale of any particular securities, as they
would in underwriting.8 8
The Court's decision also implicitly recognized that some activities not
technically considered to be underwriting could raise the spectre of subtle
hazards. 9 For example, the Court described best efforts underwriting as not
81. Id. at 209.
82. Id. at 217-20.
83. Id. at 220-21 (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 634 (1971)).
84. Id. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15) (1987) documents this limitation pursuant to the
§ 4(c)(8) exception to the BHCA in a regulatory provision reflecting the Schwab holding. 12
C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15) (1987).
85. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217.
86. Id. at 217 & n.16, 220-21.
87. Id. at 220-2 1.
88. Id. °
89. Id. at 217 n.17. The opinion stated that:
[i]n the typical distribution of securities, an underwriter purchases securities from an
issuer, frequently in association with other underwriters. The distribution of these
securities to the public may be effected by the underwriters alone, or in conjunction
with a group of dealers who also purchase and sell the particular issue of securities as
principals. Underwriters also may distribute securities under a "best efforts" agree-
ment pursuant to which large blocks of specific issues of securities are offered to the
public by the investment banker as agent for the issuer. A "best efforts" distribution
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technically constituting an underwriting.9 Because Schwab's business did
not include best efforts distribution,91 the Court left open the issue of
whether section 20 prohibited best efforts underwriting. Consequently,
Schwab left open a number of logical possibilities for the Court in the future.
The Court could broaden the definition of public sale to include activities
such as best efforts underwriting. Alternatively, the Court could limit the
definition of public sale to firm commitment underwriting, as it did in
Schwab.92 More importantly, the Court did not exclude other alternatives.
Thus, a best efforts distribution plan might not be a public sale but still could
be prohibited or regulated by section 20 under subtle hazards.
The Court's articulation of substantial deference gives further credence to
such a possibility. The Schwab Court expressed the foundation for its sub-
stantial deference to the Board's decision to authorize a bank holding com-
pany to acquire a nonbanking affiliate engaged principally in discount
brokerage services pursuant to the section 4(c)(8) exception of the BHCA,93
citing Camp and Investment Company Institute as authorities.94 The Court
would defer to the Board if the Board made a reasonable construction of the
statutory language and complied with the legislative intent of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act.95 Camp and Investment Company Institute defined subtle hazards
as the test for compliance with the Glass-Steagall legislative intent. Thus,
the Schwab Court's subtle hazards analysis corresponds to the test for con-
sistency with the legislative intent behind the Glass-Steagall Act.9 6 On the
other hand, the Schwab Court's public sale analysis corresponds to the rea-
sonable construction of the statutory language component of substantial def-
erence. Consequently, the Court's independent and conjunctive use of
public sale analysis and subtle hazards analysis logically follows from its
grounds for substantial deference. Insofar as this test is conjunctive and not
is not technically an underwriting. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 172 (2d
ed. 1961). Because Schwab's brokerage business involves none of these distribution
plans, we need not consider whether a "best efforts" distribution is prohibited under
§ 20.
Id.
90. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217 n.17.
91. Id.
92. Insofar as the Court left open the issue of whether § 20 prohibited best efforts under-
writing because Schwab's business did not include best efforts distribution, logically the Court
could also have left open the issue of whether § 20 prohibited firm underwriting plans because
Schwab's business did not include any firm commitment underwriting plans.
93. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217 n.16.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 68
(1981); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971).
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disjunctive, any activity that did not constitute underwriting and was not
expressly prohibited by the Act could nonetheless be regulated or prohibited
if it failed to comply with the legislative intent of the Act by implicating a
subtle hazard.
D. Prohibition Versus Regulation Under Glass-Steagall
The conjunction of the public sale analysis and the subtle hazards analysis
leads to four theoretical classifications of cases. The first case is when the
activity at issue does not constitute a technical underwriting and no subtle
hazards exist. A second case is when the activity at issue does not constitute
a technical underwriting yet subtle hazards exist. The third case is when the
activity at issue constitutes a technical underwriting and no subtle hazards
exist. The fourth case is when the activity at issue constitutes a technical
underwriting and subtle hazards exist as well.
The unique nature of section 20 within the Glass-Steagall pantheon fur-
ther complicates these hypothetical classifications of cases. The Court in
Investment Company Institute noted that subtly hazardous activities by bank
holding companies and their subsidiaries are more amenable to regulation
under section 20, while section 16 absolutely prohibits similar activities by
banks.97 This apparent dichotomy occurs because section 20 limits its
prohibitions to cases where the affiliate engages principally in underwriting,
whereas section 16 contains no such limitation.98 Thus, each of these four
major hypothetical fact patterns results in both a regulatory and a prohibi-
tory outcome, thereby doubling the total number of hypothetical classifica-
tions of cases.
Schwab clearly disposed of one of the fact patterns and its dual results.
The activity at issue in Schwab was not a technical underwriting, no subtle
hazards existed, and the activity was regulated pursuant to section 4(c)(8) of
the BHCA.99 In addition, the Court rejected prohibition under the
circumstances. 'o
In Investment Company Institute, the Court did not construe public sale,
but if it had, the Court would not have classified the investment advisory
services at issue as underwriting. In fact, the absence or mitigation of the
subtle hazards of underwriting distinguished the permissible investment ad-
visory services to closed-end investment companies upheld by the Court in
Investment Company Institute and the prohibited investment advisory serv-
97. 450 U.S. at 58 n.24, 60 n.26, 65-68.
98. Id.
99. 468 U.S. at 217-21.
100. Id.
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ices to open-end investment companies rejected by the Court in Camp. The
investment advisory services in Investment Company Institute were not un-
derwriting because they failed to implicate the subtle hazards of underwrit-
ing to the same degree as implicated in Camp. 101 Therefore, Investment
Company Institute would fit into the classification where the activity at issue
does not constitute a technical underwriting, subtle hazards exist, and regu-
lation occurs. However, dicta in Investment Company Institute did not fore-
close outright prohibition under similar circumstances if there are sufficient
subtle hazards to exceed the principally engaged in underwriting thresh-
old.' °2 Conversely, Camp fits within the classification where the activity at
issue is not a technical underwriting, subtle hazards are present, and the
activity at issue is prohibited. The separately legal activities of "com-
mingl[ing] trust funds on the one hand, and act[ing] as a managing agent on
the other" implicated subtle hazards when combined into an activity tanta-
mount to a mutual fund.' 3 Thus, Investment Company Institute and Camp
cover the factual circumstances where subtle hazards are dispositive to regu-
lation or prohibition.
This leaves the classifications where the activity at issue constitutes a tech-
nical underwriting. The Supreme Court in Securities Industry Association v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Bankers Trust I) "o dis-
posed of the issue of Glass-Steagall prohibition in contrast to regulation in
an analogous context. It rejected a regulatory approach giving substantial
discretion to the Federal Reserve Board where the statutory language of
101. 450 U.s. at 65-68.
102. Id. at 57-58.
103. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 624-25, 636-39 (1971).
104. 468 U.S. 137 (1984). The issue before the Court in Bankers Trust I concerned the
Federal Reserve Board's determination that a bank's offering for sale of third-party commer-
cial paper was not a security within the meaning of § 21. The Court disagreed, holding that
commercial paper does constitute a "security" under § 21. Id. at 160. The Court also re-
manded for a finding whether the bank's sale of third-party commercial paper does constitute
underwriting. Id. Two years later, in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust II), 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3853 (U.S. June 22, 1987), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the district court finding on remand from the Court that the bank's activity constituted under-
writing subject to prohibition by § 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, principally because Glass-
Steagall only prohibited public offerings and not private placements. Id. at 1052. Thus, the
principal issue on appeal concerned whether the underwriting activities at issue were subject to
Glass-Steagall prohibitions. Judge Bork used subtle hazards analysis to construe the scope of
the statutory language prohibiting underwriting insofar as the activity at issue clearly consti-
tuted a form of underwriting. Id. at 1069. In other words, Judge Bork did not use subtle
hazards analysis expansively as a basis for regulating an activity that did not constitute under-
writing. Id. Rather, he used subtle hazards analysis to narrow the scope of the express
prohibitions of the Act that would appear to cover the activities at issue. See infra text accom-
panying notes 125-33.
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Glass-Steagall expressly prohibited the activity at issue."°5 While the issue
before the Court in Bankers Trust I dealt with construing commercial paper
as a security within the meaning of section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, °6
its rationale suggests that the four remaining classifications of potential cases
can be collapsed into one category. Where the activity at issue is a technical
underwriting, it is prohibited, not regulated, irrespective of subtle hazards
analysis.' 7 Subtle hazards analysis is merely a means of statutory construc-
tion in the Bankers Trust I context. Incidentally, there is no reason to ex-
tend the Bankers Trust I rule into the classifications governed by Camp,
Investment Company Institute, and Schwab, where the activities at issue were
not technical underwritings and where subtle hazards analysis was indeed
dispositive to the outcome. Limiting Bankers Trust I in this manner is fur-
ther supported by the fact that Camp expressly viewed Glass-Steagall as a
regulatory statute10 8 and introduced subtle hazards in this context. Viewed
in this light, Camp and Investment Company Institute are properly seen as
expansive applications of Glass-Steagall based on the subtle hazards policy
concerns behind the Act. Because the literal language of the Act essentially
prohibits underwriting, regulation or prohibition of an activity not constitut-
ing underwriting which nonetheless implicates subtle hazards falls within
the Investment Company Institute or Camp authorities. On the other hand,
prohibition of underwriting, notwithstanding subtle hazards, falls within the
dictum of the Bankers Trust I view of Glass-Steagall.
E. Subtle Hazards and Glass-Steagall Legislative Reform
The most recent legislative effort to repeal or reform Glass-Steagall fo-
cused principally on overturning the Glass-Steagall Act within the circum-
stances covered by the Bankers Trust I holding." 9 The proposed reform
efforts would opt for regulation instead of prohibition where the activity at
issue constitutes an underwriting. However, the reform would prohibit un-
derwriting activity where subtle hazards exist. This would eliminate the
Bankers Trust I absolute prohibition rule, by turning the decision to regulate
or prohibit on the avoidance of subtle hazards. 1 0 Furthermore, this should
not affect the analytical foundations of the Camp and Investment Company
105. Bankers Trust 1, 468 U.S. at 147-48.
106. Id. at 140-41.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 165-66.
108. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971).
109. DRAFT FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 11.
110. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 100-305, 100th CONG., 2D SEss., 2-3, 17-18, 22, 28-29, 49-53,
121-22, 127-28, 130 (1988) (various government officials discussing the use of "firewalls" to
avoid subtle hazards).
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Institute category of cases where regulation or prohibition turns on subtle
hazards analysis.
Senator Proxmire's bill proposes to repeal Glass-Steagall's outright
prohibitions on bank involvement in the underwriting of securities with a
general authorization for bank holding companies to acquire securities affili-
ates. "' However, the bill makes this general authorization with a number of
restrictions or "firewalls". This bill premises these firewalls on a desire to
avoid subtle hazards. For example, one may argue that the bill's restrictions
on the extension of credit by the bank holding company or bank affiliates to
the securities affiliate' 12 seek to avoid the subtle hazard of shoring up the
affiliate through unsound loans. 113 One may also assert that the bill limits a
bank holding company's extension of credit for the purposes of purchasing
securities distributed or underwritten by its securities affiliate to avoid the
subtle hazard inherent when banks "make loans to customers with the ex-
pectation that the loan [will] facilitate the purchase of stocks and securi-
ties.""' 4 The same subtle hazard apparently underlies the restrictions
against the securities affiliate providing customer information to the bank.'1 5
The bill also restricts a bank's investment advice involving securities un-
derwritten by its securities affiliate. The restriction requires a bank to notify
customers of the underwriting relationship of its securities affiliate." 6 The
bill premises this restriction on subtle hazard concerns with a "conflict be-
tween the promotional interest of the investment banker and the obligation
of the commercial banker to render disinterested investment advice." 1 7 In
addition, the bill prohibits interlocking directorates between a bank holding
company and any affiliate bank. Furthermore, the bill requires disclosure of
information to prevent conflicts of interest, as required by the Federal Re-
serve Board of Governors." 8 The bill grounds both of these firewalls on a
desire to avoid all of the conflicts of interest. Such concerns also include the
subtle hazard of the bank making "its credit facilities more freely available"
or making "unsound loans . . [to] companies in whose .. .securities the
111. See DRAFr FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 11, § 102, at 2-13.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 635-37 (1971) (citing Hearings on S. Res.
71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 20,
237, 1063 (1931)).
114. DRAFr FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 11, at 6; Camp, 401 U.S. at
632 (citing S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1931)).
115. DRAFT FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 11, at 8.
116. Id.
117. Camp, 401 U.S. at 633 (citing 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1931) (statement of Sen.
Bulkley)).
118. DRAFT FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note Il, at 8.
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affiliate has invested."' 19 The bill, one may also reason, premises the restric-
tion against a bank providing customer information to its securities affili-
ate 12 on avoiding the-subtle hazard that "bank depositors might suffer
losses on investments they purchased in reliance on the relationship between
the bank and its affiliate."' 12 1
Finally, one may assume the bill bases its requirement to disclose "that
the securities affiliate is not a bank" '22 on avoiding the subtle hazard of im-
paired public confidence in the bank when its securities affiliate fares
badly. 123 Thus, the bill deals with virtually every subtle hazard in one way
or another by the firewalls proposed in the bill, notwithstanding the view
that it is purely an effort to repeal Glass-Steagall.' 24 An application of the
above classification scheme to Senator Proxmire's bill reveals an interesting
shift in focus from the broad prohibitions in the Glass-Steagall act to a more
directed focus on specific firewalls meant to avoid subtle hazards. Conse-
quently, in an era of Glass-Steagall reform in the legislative branch, the pol-
icy concerns captured by subtle hazards analysis may have become the more
meaningful way of analyzing issues.
II. SUBTLE HAZARDS CHALLENGED
It is with the above discussion in mind that a contrary trend concerning
Glass-Steagall analysis has emerged in the courts. In Securities Industry As-
sociation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Bankers Trust
II), 125 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit made the first challenge to the Camp, Investment Company Institute,
and Schwab two-pronged formulation of the basis for substantial deference
to Federal Reserve Board Glass-Steagall decisions in a section 16 context
dealing with banks.' 26 In dictum, the Bankers Trust II court reasoned that
the Supreme Court had never held that Glass-Steagall permitted or prohib-
ited any particular banking practice based solely on subtle hazards. 127 The
119. Camp, 401 U.S. at 631.
120. DRAFT FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 11, at 8.
121. Camp, 401 U.S. at 631 & n.24 (citing 77 CONG. REC. 4028 (1931) (statement of Rep.
Fish)).
122. DRAFT FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 11, at 7.
123. Camp, 401 U.S. at 631 (citing Hearings on S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71 Cong., 3d Sess. 20, 237, 1063 (1931)).
124. DRAFr FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AT, supra note 11, at 5-8; see also supra text
accompanying notes 30-38.
125. 807 F.2d 1052, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. Jun. 22,
1987).
126. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 94-105.
127. 807 F.2d at 1069. The court's factual premise is worthy of challenge. In Camp, the
Supreme Court prohibited bank sponsorship of mutual fund-like accounts principally based on
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Bankers Trust 11 court further reasoned that avoidance of subtle hazards by
regulation without necessarily "totally obliterat[ing] ... [them] suffices." '128
Therefore, although the court found that a subtle hazard existed,129 it still
gave substantial deference to the Board's approval of Bankers Trust's (a
bank) proposed placement of commercial paper issued by third parties.13°
The court based its decision on Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 131 and Investment Company Institute v. Conover, 132 which de-
ferred to administrative decisions, in the absence of a clearly defined con-
gressional intent. The Bankers Trust II court questioned the validity of the
Camp formulation of subtle hazards because the Camp Court established the
subtle hazards standard in the absence of any formulation by the responsible
regulatory agency.' 3 3 Thus, Bankers Trust II blazed the trail for the subse-
subtle hazards analysis. 401 U.S. at 629-39. Arguably, subtle hazards analysis was the deter-
minative basis for the majority holding in Camp. Id. At any rate, Judge Bork, in Bankers
Trust II, only discussed the Glass-Steagall classification of cases covered by Bankers Trust I,
where the literal language of the Glass-Steagall Act expressly prohibited the activity at issue.
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (NatWest), 821 F.2d
810, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-562).
In fact, in NatWest, Judge Bork distinguished Investment Co. Institute and NatWest from
Bankers Trust I on the very grounds that NatWest and Investment Co. Institute involved facts
where the "literal Language of the Act" did not prohibit the activity at issue, whereas Bankers
Trust I involved an activity expressly covered by the literal language of the Act. Id. at 818; see
infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text. Consequently, if Judge Bork is also recognizing
this distinction in Bankers Trust II, then the inference from this distinction that subtle hazards
is nondispositive to the outcome in such cases is true. However, if Judge Bork also assumed
that this premise is true for the classification of cases governed by Camp, Investment Co. Insti-
tute, and Schwab, his premise is too broad: the circumstances covered by these cases are not
the same as the circumstances covered by the Bankers Trust cases because of the very distinc-
tion he later adopted in NatWest.
128. 807 F.2d at 1069.
129. Id.
130. Id. Even if the factual premise of Bankers Trust H was true, that the Supreme Court
has never prohibited an activity solely based on subtle hazards analysis, the notion that subtle
hazards should be rejected assumes that there is no role for subtle hazards analysis and the
Glass-Steagall Act in a regulatory framework and that the Glass-Steagall Act is purely a pro-
hibitory statute. Such an assumption would ignore the Court's expansive use of subtle hazards
analysis in Investment Co. Institute to evaluate the adequacy of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors' regulation within the framework of the BHCA. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at
67-68. It also ignores the Investment Co. Institute Court's use of subtle hazards to distinguish
the activities at issue from Camp, which prohibited them. Id. at 65-67. Furthermore, the
Camp Court expressly viewed the Glass-Steagall Act as both a regulatory and prohibitory
statute. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626 (1971).
131. 467 U.S. 837, 846 (1984).
132. 790 F.2d 925, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
133. Id. Apparently, the absence of any OCC interpretation of congressional intent con-
cerning Glass-Steagall in Camp belies the Court's formulation of subtle hazards, notwithstand-
ing its reliance on Glass-Steagall legislative history. In fact, the Camp Court engaged in an
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quent challenge to the subtle hazards analysis component of substantial
deference.
The decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in NatWest '34 represented a significant break from prior
precedent, not only because of its holding, but also because of the court's
rationale. The NatWest court ignored the Camp union of powers premise to
its subtle hazards analysis and undermined the independence of subtle
hazards analysis from the Schwab public sale analysis of section 20. If fol-
lowed in future cases, 135 it has the potential to fundamentally change the
nature of the relationship between the Glass-Steagall Act and BHCA.
NatWest applied to the Board for approval of an affiliate arrangement for
providing investment advisory and brokerage services under section 4(c)(8)
extensive review of the legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act to formulate the subtle
hazards standard. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 629-35.
134. 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988)
(No. 87-562).
135. NatWest applied to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in August 1985, pursu-
ant to § 4(c)(8) of the BHCA and § 225.23(a)(3) of regulation Y, for approval of the provision
of investment advisory and brokerage services by a newly formed affiliate (the CSC), limited to
institutional as opposed to retail customers. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982); 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.23(a)(3) (1987); Federal Reserve Board of Governors Press Release (Oct. 23, 1985).
NatWest's application limited the CSC's brokerage activities to those of an agent "solely for
the account of customers" and further stated that NatWest would "not ... bear the financial
risk" as an underwriter in the securities "it brokers or recommends." Id. at 2. In addition,
NatWest's application provided that a portion of the CSC's investment advisory services qual-
ify under § 2(a)(20) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Id. at 1 (citing Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80-2(20) (1982)). The definition of investment adviser in
§ 2(a)(20) follows:
(20) "Investment adviser" of an investment company means (A) any person (other
than a bona fide officer, director, trustee, member of an advisory board, or employee
of such company, as such) who pursuant to contract with such company regularly
furnishes advice to such company with respect to the desirability of investing in,
purchasing or selling securities or other property, or is empowered to determine what
securities or other property shall be purchased or sold by such company, and (B) any
other person who pursuant to contract with a person described in clause (A) of this
paragraph regularly performs substantially all of the duties undertaken by such per-
son described in said clause (A); but does not include (i) a person whose advise is
furnished solely through uniform publications distributed to subscribers thereto, (ii)
a person who furnishes only statistical and other factual information, advice regard-
ing economic factors and trends, or advice as to occasional transactions in specific
securities, but without generally furnishing advice or making recommendations re-
garding the purchase or sale of securities, (iii) a company furnishing such services at
cost to one or more investment companies, insurance companies, or other financial
institutions, (iv) any person, the character and amount of whose compensation for
such services must be approved by a court, or (v) such other persons as the Commis-
sion may by rules and regulations or order determine not to be within the intent of
this definition.
15 U.S.C. § 80-2(20) (1982) (emphasis added).
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of-the BHCA. 136 NatWest's application included many provisions clearly
designed to avoid the hazards or subtle hazards of investment banking iden-
tified by the Supreme Court in Camp. 137 Relying, in part, on these restric-
tions, the Board approved NatWest's application, while challenging the need
for subtle hazards analysis.' 31 The Securities Industry Association (SIA)
136. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
137. For example, the application provided that CSC would not charge an explicit fee for
the investment advice and would receive fees only for transactions executed for customers. If
its customers desired, CSC would provide investment advice or execution services separately
and for individual fees. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 812; National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed.
Res. Bull. 584 (1986). The D.C. Circuit, in its review of the Board determination, used this to
support its rationale that all of CSC's profits were attributable to its brokerage commissions
and that consequently there was no promotional incentive in the sale of particular securities
from its investment advisory services. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 817. It is noteworthy that the
Board did not seize on this as a factor in its subtle hazards analysis. NatWest's application
also provided that "CSC would not share customer or depositor lists or confidential informa-
tion" with NatWest. Id. at 812 (citing unpublished NatWest application). While no prohibi-
tion against such sharing exists in the Glass-Steagall Act, the Supreme Court gleaned from the
Act's legislative history the subtle hazard arising from the "plain conflict between the promo-
tional interest of the investment banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render
disinterested investment advice." Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 633 (1971)
(citing 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1931)); 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also supra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text. The Camp Court then cited remarks from Senator Bul-
kley that criticized the use of depositor lists by commercial banks to promote particular invest-
ments. Camp, 401 U.S. at 633 (citing 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1931)).
The Board requested public comment on NatWest's application on October 23, 1985. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Press Release (Oct. 23, 1985). Prior to rendering
its determination, the Board obtained additional commitments from NatWest. National West-
minster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 584-85. Again, the premise for these commitments
rested on avoiding some of the subtle hazards of investment banking. Id. For example, the
commitments provided that the CSC would "not refer its customers who desire to purchase
securities on credit to any Affiliate"; that "there will be no established program by which an
Affiliate will extend credit for securities purchases to the subsidiary's customers"; and, that
"[t]he subsidiary will not transmit its investment advisory research or recommendations to the
commercial lending department of any member of the NatWest group." Id.; see also Nat West,
821 F.2d at 812 (citing to unpublished joint appendix). Such restrictions avoid the subtle
hazard associated with making loans to customers "to facilitate the purchase of securities" in
which the banks have a promotional stake. Id. In addition, the requirement that NatWest
disclose to a customer and obtain consent when the CSC brokers a transaction "where the
counterparty (as principal) is a member of the NatWest group" clearly sought to avoid the
subtle hazards associated with the conflict between the promotional interest of the investment
banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested investment advice.
Id. at 812 n.4 (citing to unpublished joint appendix); see also Camp, 401 U.S. at 633. Likewise,
restrictions against directors and officers serving both the CSC and any other member of the
NatWest group sought to avoid this same conflict. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 812 n.4 (citing to
unpublished joint appendix); see also National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at
584-85.
138. The Board approved NatWest's application on June 13, 1986. National Westminster
Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 584. The Board found that CSC's activities were closely
related to banking and a proper incident to banking under § 4(c)(8) of the BHCA. Id. at 585-
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petitioned for review of the Board's decision, challenging the approval under
section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act.' 3 9 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition, giving substantial
deference to the Board's decision. "
The NatWest court exclusively grounded this deference upon its finding
that the Board properly construed the meaning of public sale under section
20. 41 The Nat West court did not premise this deference on the reasonable-
ness of the Board's subtle hazards analysis.' 4 2 Instead, the court extended
the logic of the Board's criticism of subtle hazards analysis and attempted to
supply an alternative to a subtle hazards-based substantial deference, relying
on dicta from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 43 Under the court's rationale, one might assume that Congress did not
intend to regulate any activity not falling within the literal definition of pub-
lic sale in section 20. In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that courts must
91. The Board reasoned that no violation of §§ 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act resulted
from the formation of CSC by NatWest because the combination of investment advice and
brokerage services did not constitute a public sale. Id. at 592-94. The Board based this con-
clusion on the fact that the term "public sale" in § 20 prohibits underwriting only. Id. Thus,
brokerage and investment advisory services are not underwriting. Id. at 592.
The Board also questioned the logic of engaging in a subtle hazards analysis "where the
activity is permissible under the literal terms of the statute." Id. at 594. The Board ignored
the union of powers rationale of Camp by focusing principally on the Schwab Court's use of
subtle hazards analysis. As an example of a situation where the Supreme Court "has not relied
on the possibility of 'subtle hazards' as determinative of the legality of a particular activity,"
the Board again used Schwab. Id. Furthermore, the Board relied upon its earlier rationale
that the proposed activities at issue were "not a public sale" as a principal reason why no
subtle hazards were in fact implicated. Id. For example, since CSC would act "solely as
agent" and not as an underwriter, its activities would not implicate any subtle hazards. Id.
The Board reasoned that no difference existed between the discount broker in Schwab and the
broker providing investment advice in NatWest in terms of their relative subtle hazards. Id.
According to the Board, "virtually all of the potential hazards cited by the SIA" might poten-
tially arise when a banking organization provides investment advice alone. Id. Finally, the
Board assumed that Investment Co. Inst. stood for the proposition that "the provision of in-
vestment advice to an investment company does not violate the Glass-Steagall Act ... pro-
vided that the bank [providing these services] does not underwrite any issue of securities or
purchase any securities of the investment company." Id. at 592. In other words, the Board
determined that whether or not investment advice involves underwriting, the activity expressly
prohibited by the literal terms of § 20 represents the only qualifier on the legality of the in-
dependent provision of investment advisory services under Glass-Steagall. Even so, the Board
expressly recognized subtle hazards analysis in its determination as the basis for the Board's
regulation of activities permissible under the terms of the Act. Id. at 595.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
140. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 813.
141. Id. at 813-15.
142. Id. at 813.
143. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-45 (1984)).
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defer where Congress failed to express an intent toward a particular con-
struction and the administrative agency based its determination upon a rea-
sonable policy. 1"
The NatWest court questioned the need for a subtle hazards analysis
where the express statutory language of Glass-Steagall failed to prohibit the
activity at issue.145 Furthermore, the court assumed the nonexistence of
subtle hazards in any activity other than underwriting as a premise in a
number of areas critical to its rationale. 146 For example, the court reasoned
that no salesman's stake existed in the sale of particular securities by County
Services Corporation (CSC) because CSC maintained no relationship with
any issuer of securities.' 47 The court also found no difference between dis-
count brokerage services and full scale brokerage services that include in-
vestment advisory services to institutional customers.' 4 8 In support of this,
the court determined that because Schwab found no subtle hazards to dis-
count brokerage services, 49 it was dispositive.' ° This was largely because
the factual circumstances of both Schwab and NatWest excluded any under-
writing activities.' 5 ' Finally, the court reasoned that activities sanctioned
when separately conducted must also be sanctioned when combined in a
union of powers.'5 2 Thus, because section 20 failed to prohibit the separate
provision of investment advisory services in Investment Company Institute
and the separate provision of discount brokerage services in Schwab, no pro-
hibition could exist from the union of these powers.'15  Through this latter
finding the NatWest court implicitly rejected the union of powers premise of
the Camp decision.
Thus, the NatWest court's rationale served to reframe the Glass-Steagall
analysis of bank holding company activities. Under this view, the courts
need not determine whether the union of powers' 54 implicates any subtle
hazards because Nat West essentially displaces subtle hazards analysis with
the statutory construction of public sale. Thus, under the court's rationale,
the issue becomes one of whether the union of these powers constitutes un-
144. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
145. 821 F.2d at 816 n.8.
146. Id. at 813-17.
147. Id. at 816-17.
148. Id.
149. 468 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1984).
150. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 817.
151. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217; NatWest, 821 F.2d at 817.
152. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 813-14.
153. Id. at 814.
154. Id. at 813-14; see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 645 (1971) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). But see id. at 624-39.
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derwriting."' The court reasoned that because underwriting constituted
either purchasing securities from an issuer, or acting as the agent of an is-
suer,'56 the combination of investment advice with brokerage services fell
outside of the activities regulated by section 20.117 Thus, the NatWest
court's rationale assumes that no subtle hazards arise when brokerage serv-
ices and investment advisory services are combined because brokerage serv-
ices and investment advisory services do not individually constitute
underwriting. In other words, the court's rationale assumes that the subtle
hazards of investment banking exist only in association with firm commit-
ment underwriting.'
The NatWest opinion provided two additional reasons for ignoring subtle
hazards in assessing the permissibility of bank holding company activity.
First, Judge Bork cited Investment Company Institute to support the propo-
sition that no significant difference exists between investment advisory serv-
ices and the traditional fiduciary functions of banks.'5 9 To the court, any
holding that found the combination of investment advisory and brokerage
services activities to implicate subtle hazards would render unlawful invest-
ment advisory activities, including those traditionally performed by bank
trust departments.'" Thus, Judge Bork found illegitimate any application
of subtle hazards that would invalidate traditional bank services.' 6 1 Second,
the court found no implication of subtle hazards by the addition of invest-
ment advisory services to brokerage services because CSC received commis-
sions only on transactions executed, regardless of the investment advice
provided. 162 Therefore, according to the court, CSC's profits depended
solely on the volume of shares traded and not on the sale of particular securi-
ties.163 Although Judge Bork rejected the use of subtle hazards analysis, he
grudgingly applied it and found it nondispositive because the subtle hazards
associated with a salesman's stake were not present.'6
Finally, the NatWest court rejected the SIA argument that Bankers Trust
I required prohibition of CSC's activities, because the Glass-Steagall Act was
155. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
156. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 814.
157. Id.
158. This is because the District of Columbia Circuit presumed not to deal with best efforts
underwriting. Id. at 814 n.7.
159. Id. at 817-18 (citing Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 63 (1981)).
160. Id. at 817.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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not a regulatory statute.1 61 Judge Bork found the facts of NatWest more
comparable with the facts of Investment Company Institute than with those
in Bankers Trust 1166 where the activity at issue was expressly within the
"literal language of the statute."' 6 7 Thus, in both Investment Company In-
stitute and NatWest, the statute did not expressly prohibit the activities at
issue. Therefore, the activities at issue in NatWest and Investment Company
Institute were more amenable to regulation and not subject to the Bankers
Trust I rule.
III. ARE THE DISPOSITIVE FACTS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE, SCHWAB AND NATWEST REALLY IDENTICAL?
A. Substantial Deference
This Note does not question the reasonableness of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors' construction of public sale in section 20168 of the Act in
NatWest, '69 particularly because the Supreme Court settled this construc-
tion in Schwab. 70 This Note focuses on the problems with the NatWest
court's attempt to ground its substantial deference exclusively on the con-
struction of public sale.' 7 ' Apparently, the NatWest court assumed that the
construction of public sale in section 20 was dispositive as to the outcome of
its subtle hazards analysis.' 72 This approach apparently views subtle
hazards analysis as superfluous.
173
The Supreme Court has not yet expressly overturned subtle hazards anal-
ysis. Under precedent existing prior to NatWest, courts must base substan-
tial deference to Board determinations upon the two-pronged analysis of the
Camp to Schwab cases. 174 First, the Board must reasonably construe the
pertinent Glass-Steagall provision.' 75 Schwab limits the prohibitions of sec-
tion 20 to firm commitment underwriting and leaves open the possibility of
165. Id. at 818 (citing Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. (Bankers Trust I), 468 U.S. 117, 137 (1984)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
169. 821 F.2d at 813-14.
170. 468 U.S. 207, 217-21 (1984).
171. 821 F.2d at 813.
172. Id. at 816-18.
173. Id.
174. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1971); Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217;
see also Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 68
(1981).
175. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217.
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best efforts underwriting. 76 Second, the Board must reasonably apply a
subtle hazards analysis in support of its regulation of the activity under
Glass-Steagall. 1"'
However, the NatWest court essentially extends the logic of Bankers Trust
11178 and the Board's reasoning in its NatWest decision 79 when it expressly
assumes that courts may ground substantial deference exclusively on reason-
able construction of the meaning of public sale in section 20 °80 and when it
later reasons that NatWest's proposed activities do not implicate subtle
hazards because these activities are not the public sale prohibited in section
20.181 Bankers Trust 11 questioned the weight accorded to the Camp subtle
hazards and the sufficiency of subtle hazards as a condition for permitting or
prohibiting any activities under the Glass-Steagall Act.1 82 Likewise, the
Board in National Westminster Bank, PLC, argued that subtle hazards have
never determined the legality of an activity not expressly prohibited by the
literal terms of the Glass-Steagall Act.18 3 However, the fact that an activity
is not defined expressly within a reasonable construction of the literal terms
of prohibition of the Act has never by itself caused the Supreme Court to
hold that Glass-Steagall permits the activity.184 The Court has held that
grounds for substantial deference are conjunctive, not disjunctive, including:
(1) reasonable construction of statutory terms and (2) subtle hazards analy-
sis as to the congressional intent.' Furthermore, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to Board regulation of investment advisory services in Investment
Company Institute under the rubric of subtle hazards analysis without deter-
mining whether or not the Act expressly prohibited investment advisory
services.
The Court has also assumed that there are subtle hazards to activities that
are not underwriting."" In Schwab, the Court accepted the possibility that
176. Id. at 217-19.
177. Id. at 217; Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 68; Camp, 401 U.S. at 627-28.
178. 807 F.2d 1052, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. Jun. 22,
1987).
179. National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584, 594 (1986).
180. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (NatWest),
821 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No.
87-562).
181. Id. at 817.
182. 807 F.2d at 1069.
183. 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 594.
184. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Schwab), 468
U.S. 207 (1984); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S.
60 (1981).
185. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217.
186. 450 U.S. at 60.
187. Id. at 65-68.
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an activity, not technically an underwriting, could nonetheless implicate the
subtle hazards of underwriting. 18' Therefore, the fact that subtle hazards is
not a sufficient condition for legality of a particular activity189 does not mean
that it is not a necessary condition for legality. The Board and Supreme
Court have either prohibited or regulated investment advisory services in
different contexts based upon the subtle hazards implicated by the proposed
services at issue. 9 ° This regulation or prohibition has occurred notwith-
standing the determination that investment advisory services may not neces-
sarily constitute the underwriting of securities. Therefore, it is erroneous
under present law for the Nat West court to ground its substantial deference
on only the first prong of the substantial deference test. 9 '
B. Investment Advisory Services
Judge Bork oversimplified Investment Company Institute when he asserted
the legality of the separate provision of investment advisory services'
92
under section 20. Investment Company Institute does not stand for the prop-
osition that the independent provision of investment advice is not prohibited
by section 201"3 because investment advice does not constitute the public
sale194 of securities. Investment Company Institute did not construe public
sale when it engaged in subtle hazards analysis of a Federal Reserve Board
regulation.' 95 Rather, Investment Company Institute assumed that in some
cases the Glass-Steagall Act may prohibit the individual provision of invest-
ment advice.' 96 For example, the Glass-Steagall Act arguably prohibits in-
vestment advice of bank holding companies and their affiliates to mutual
188. 468 U.S. at 217 n.17.
189. The National Westminster Bank PLC decision by the Board stated: "The Supreme
Court has not relied on the possibility of subtle hazards as determinative of the legality of a
particular activity, where the activity is permissible under the literal terms of the statute." 72
Fed. Res. Bull. 584, 594 (1986). Likewise, in Bankers Trust II, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reasoned that " 'subtle hazards' . . have never alone caused the Supreme Court to hold
that Glass-Steagall permits or prohibits any particular banking practice." 807 F.2d 1052, 1069
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. Jun. 22, 1987). And a footnote in the
District of Columbia Circuit's NatWest opinion questions the need for subtle hazards analysis
once the literal terms of prohibition are construed. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (NatWest), 821 F.2d 810, 816 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-562).
190. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 66-68.
191. 821 F.2d at 813.
192. Id. at 813-14 (discussing the Investment Co. Inst. case).
193. 450 U.S. at 46.
194. But see NatWest, 821 F.2d at 813-14.
195. 450 U.S. at 66-69.
196. Id. at 65-66.
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funds (open-end investment companies) for two reasons.' 97 First, the Board
regulation at issue in Investment Company Institute limited itself to invest-
ment advisory services in the closed-end investment company context.
198
Second, Camp rejected the OCC regulation sanctioning bank operation of an
activity tantamount to an open-end investment company.1 99 The Investment
Company Institute Court distinguished its upholding of the Board regulation
from Camp on the basis that subtle hazards associated with a bank's invest-
ment advisory services in an open-end investment company context were
absent when an affiliate limited its investment advisory services to the closed-
end investment company context.
The Investment Company Institute Court reasoned that investment advi-
sors to closed-end investment companies are not principally engaged in the
underwriting of securities because the activity implicates none of the subtle
hazards or policies behind section 20. Principally, the advisory fee earned by
the "adviser to a closed-end company increases only if the value of the in-
vestment portfolio increases" whereas the "fee of the adviser to a mutual
fund increases both with the increase in value of the investment portfolio
and through the sale of the company's shares.",2° ' Therefore, "[t]he advi-
sory fee earned by the bank would provide little incentive to the bank or its
holding company to engage in promotional activities" when limited to the
closed-end investment company context.20 2 Thus, the implication remained
that investment advisory services provided under some other arrangement,
such as investment advisors to open-end investment companies, could in fact
exceed the principally engaged threshold 203 and, thereby, fall within the pro-
hibition of section 20.
The Court in Investment Company Institute did not make much of the fact
that the investment advisory services involved a bank holding company con-
text as compared with the bank context of Camp. The Court distinguished
the cases based on their subtle hazards analyses and not on the difference
between bank holding company and bank regulation under the Act.2 ' At
the least, Judge Bork's interpretation of Investment Company Institute is
subject to question when he asserts that it stands for the proposition that
investment advice in all contexts is permissible. 205 The most Judge Bork can
197. Id.
198. Id. at 49-51, 65-68.
199. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625-26 (1971).
200. 450 U.S. at 65-68.
201. Id. at 67 & n.40 (emphasis added).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 65-68.
205. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. (NatWest), 821
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assert is that the Court has not yet rendered a holding on investment advi-
sory services to open-end investment companies in a bank holding company
act context. However, given the readiness of the Court to apply subtle
hazards analysis freely in the bank holding context from Investment Com-
pany Institute to Schwab, the more reasonable textual reading of Investment
Company Institute may be the limited one of this Note. Thus, Investment
Company Institute is insufficient authority to support CSC's investment advi-
sory services, even when separated from brokerage services, because the in-
vestment advisory services in NatWest are not limited to the closed-end
investment company circumstances governed by the Investment Company
Institute holding.2"6
C. "Closely Related" to Banking and "Subtle Hazards" Analyses
Judge Bork also used the Investment Company Institute analysis of invest-
ment advisory services to state that combined brokerage and investment ad-
visory services do not differ significantly from the "traditional fiduciary
functions" of banks.20 7 From this he concluded, first, that combined broker-
age and investment advisory services were not the public sale of securities20 8
prohibited by section 20. Second, he concluded that combined brokerage
and investment advisory services did not implicate any subtle hazards.20 9 In
Investment Company Institute, the Court argued that the services of invest-
ment advice were not "significantly different from the traditional fiduciary"
functions of banks for the purposes of finding investment advisory services as
closely related to banking210 in a section 4(c)(8) context.21" The fact that
investment advice closely relates to banking does not necessarily mean that
F.2d 810, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No.
87-562).
206. Id.; Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 49-
51, 65-68 (1981).
207. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 817-18. But see Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 56-58.
208. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 814.
209. Id. at 817. Of course, this second argument is from Justice Blackmun's uncited dis-
sent in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 644-45 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Judge Bork did not give credit to Justice Blackmun for this argument. Instead, the District of
Columbia Circuit in NatWest cited the dicta in Investment Co. Inst. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 817-
18 (citing Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 63). However, the applicability of Justice Black-
mun's rationale to a bank holding company or affiliate context is questionable insofar as he
framed his dissent in the context of activities proposed for banks. Camp, 401 U.S. at 644-45
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The argument is certainly stronger in the context of comparing
services proposed for banks than it would be in the NatWest context of services proposed for
bank holding companies and affiliates. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
210. 450 U.S. at 55-58.
211. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
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section 20 always authorizes investment advice by a bank.2 12 Nor does this
negate the existence of any subtle hazards when investment advisory services
combine with brokerage services.213 Consequently, the Investment Company
Institute Court further stated that even though investment advice is closely
related to banking in satisfaction of the two-part section 4(c)(8) test, the
Board would have to evaluate each application to determine if the proposed
activity constituted a "proper incident to banking., 214 This independent ex-
amination would assure that an affiliate "does not exceed the bounds of
traditional fiduciary functions of managing customer accounts., 215 Judge
Bork's interpretation of Investment Company Institute implied there was no
need for this second step of analysis. He assumed from the close relationship
of investment advisory services and brokerage services to banking, that an
affiliate engaged in these services would never "exceed the bounds of tradi-
tional fiduciary functions."'2 16 In other words, he collapsed the closely re-
lated to banking and proper incident to banking tests when he interpreted
Investment Company Institute in this manner. While there are indeed simi-
larities between the Glass-Steagall Act and the BHCA, it is unprecedented
and confusing for the NatWest court to transport the Investment Company
Institute Court's closely related to banking analysis under the BHCA to re-
solve Glass-Steagall issues such as the existence or nonexistence of subtle
hazards. The Court in Investment Company Institute considered Glass-Stea-
gall concerns to be unresolved by the closely related to banking analysis in
support of the Board regulation.217 It viewed the regulation upheld by the
closely related test as merely a preliminary authorization subject to subse-
quent proper incident to banking analysis.218 The Investment Company In-
stitute Court expressly contemplated Glass-Steagall and subtle hazards
challenges as inherent in the "proper incident to banking" determinations of
the Board. 21 9
Furthermore, the Board and the Supreme Court have found subtle
hazards where an activity is closely related to banking. 22° The Board's miti-
gation, through regulation, of the hazards in Investment Company Institute
does not disprove their existence.221 Likewise, the Camp Court majority
212. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 814-15.
213. Id. at 817.
214. 450 U.S. at 57.
215. Id. at 57-58.
216. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 814-15.
217. 450 U.S. at 57.
218. Id. at 64.
219. Id. at 57-58, 64, 68.
220. Id. at 67.
221. Id. at 67 n.39.
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found subtle hazards in the management of mutual fund accounts by a bank,
a service described by the Camp dissent as a traditional fiduciary function of
banks.22 2 Thus, it is erroneous for Judge Bork to argue that traditional fidu-
ciary functions of banks or activities closely related to banking by definition
raise no subtle hazards.
D. NatWest and Schwab
Judge Bork reasoned that Schwab was dispositive of NatWest.223 He fre-
quently used Schwab as a rationale for the nonexistence of subtle hazards in
224CSC's proposed activities. Schwab certainly was dispositive as to the rea-
sonableness of the Board's construction of public sale in section 20,225 but it
did not dispose of the outcome of the Nat West subtle hazards analysis,
226
particularly because Schwab only considered discount brokerage services
and not the subtle hazards of investment advisory services.227
Schwab construed all of the terms of prohibition in section 20221 to limit
them to firm-commitment underwriting. However, the case expressly left
open the issue of the status of best efforts underwriting in section 20.229 If
the Schwab construction of public sale indeed disposed of subtle hazards in
Nat West, 230 then only firm commitment, and perhaps best efforts, under-
writing would ever implicate any subtle hazards. This would ignore the fact
that Schwab engaged in subtle hazards analysis even though it accepted that
Schwab would not underwrite securities.231
Judge Bork managed to analyze the outcome of subtle hazards analysis in
NatWest as virtually identical to Schwab by introducing a new argument for
the absence of subtle hazards. The discount brokerage subsidiary in Schwab
did not underwrite. 232 CSC in NatWest did not underwrite. 233 Thus, the
222. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625-39 (1971); id. at 644-45 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
223. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (NatWest),
821 F.2d 810, 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988)
(No. 87-562).
224. Id. at 817.
225. Id. at 813-14.
226. But see id. at 817 (stating Schwab "is dispositive with respect to the nonexistence of
any 'subtle hazards' ").
227. Securities Indus. Ass'nv. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Schwab) , 468
U.S. 207, 220-21 (1984).
228. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
229. Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217-18.
230. 821 F.2d at 817.
231. 468 U.S. at 220-21.
232. Id. at 217.
233. 821 F.2d at 814, 817.
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common denominator in the different factual circumstances of these cases
was the absence of any relationship between Schwab or CSC on the one
hand, and any issuer of securities, on the other.2 34 The next step implicit in
Judge Bork's analysis reveals the danger of making inductive generalizations
from one particular. There were no subtle hazards in Schwab; therefore,
Judge Bork might argue, there were no subtle hazards in NatWest. This
conclusion is implicit in Bork's argument that the absence of a relationship
with an issuer negates a particular subtle hazard.235
A review of the Camp Court's discussion of subtle hazards does not sup-
port such a simple formula. How can one a priori assume that "the conflict
between the promotional interest of the investment banker and the obliga-
tion of the commercial banker to render disinterested investment advice
' 236
will only occur in a firm underwriting context? The Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank bail-out of its subsidiary in the wake of the October 1987 stock
market crash 2 3 7 clearly undermines the notion that banks will only "shore
up . . .[their] affiliate[s] with unsound loans" in a firm underwriting con-
text.238 The investment advisory services in Investment Company Institute
did not constitute underwriting. Yet the investment advisory activities at
issue in Investment Company Institute implicated subtle hazards avoidable
by regulatory restrictions promulgated within the framework of the
BHCA.2 39 Therefore, underwriting is not the exclusive cause of all the sub-
tle hazards of investment banking. In sum, the NatWest reduction of the
subtle hazards of Camp to this single test is highly questionable in the ab-
sence of any technical study, testimony, or legislative history to support such
a reduction.
1. Is Best Efforts Underwriting an Open Issue?
The absence of a relationship with an issuer cannot be a reason for the
absence of subtle hazards in Nat West if the legality of best efforts underwrit-
ing is truly left an open issue. On the one hand, the NatWest court presumed
not to articulate any dictum on the legality of "best efforts underwriting" by
CSC, particularly because the Schwab Court had expressly left the door open
to challenging the legality of best efforts underwriting. 2" On the other
234. Id.
235. Id. at 814-17.
236. 401 U.S. 617, 629-39 (1971).
237. See supra note 12.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
240. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Schwab), 468
U.S. 207, 217 n.18 (1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
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hand, it reasoned that CSC's activities would not implicate the subtle
hazards of a salesman's stake in the sale of particular securities because
"CSC [would] have no relationship with any issuer." '241 Judge Bork also
reasoned that there would be "no relationship with the issuer" because CSC
would act neither as a firm commitment nor a best efforts underwriter. 242
This results in an inconsistency within Judge Bork's opinion. On the one
hand, the logic of Nat West entails that best efforts underwriting implicates
the subtle hazards of underwriting because best efforts underwriting by defi-
nition involves a relationship with an issuer. On the other hand, the
NatWest opinion purported to leave open the issue as to the legality of best
efforts underwriting. If best efforts underwriting is later held to be legal in
section 20 contexts, then the absence of a relationship with an issuer cannot
be a reason for the absence of a salesman's stake in the sale of particular
securities.
2. Relationship with Issuer in NatWest
Another inconsistency in Judge Bork's opinion concerned his assertion
that "CSC will have no relationship with any issuer." '243 This is one of the
principal reasons he advanced in support of his rationale that CSC's pro-
posed activities did not implicate the subtle hazards of underwriting.2 4
Judge Bork's assertion is belied by the Federal Reserve Board's regulation of
the relationship between CSC and any "member of the NatWest Group"
that is a "counterparty (as principal)" to a securities transaction brokered by
CSC.245
When the Federal Reserve Board imposed additional restrictions on
NatWest's application, which required that CSC inform its customers and
obtain their consent to any brokerage transaction within this relationship, 246
the Federal Reserve Board implicitly recognized several aspects of this rela-
tionship. First, the potential existed for imputation of relationships between
other NatWest affiliates and issuers to CSC. Second, this relationship re-
quired additional restrictions to avoid implication of subtle hazards. In this
case, the subtle hazards might consist of having a promotional interest,
which "conflicted" with CSC's provision of "disinterested investment ad-
Sys. (NatWest), 821 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan.
12, 1988) (No. 87-562).
241. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 817.
242. Id. at 814.
243. Id. at 814, 817.
244. Id. at 817.
245. Id. at 812 n.4.
246. Id.
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vice." '24 7 If CSC were to have a "promotional interest" in the sale of securi-
ties by virtue of its investment advisory services, then Judge Bork's premise,
that only underwriting implicates "subtle hazards," would prove clearly
unfounded.
3. Schwab Holding Limitations
Even if the premise were true that "CSC will have no relationship with
any issuer," the conclusion that this necessarily negates any subtle hazards
associated with NatWest having a salesman's stake in the sale of particular
securities 248 does not automatically follow. Even if "the decision in Schwab
[were] dispositive with respect to the nonexistence of any 'subtle
hazards,' 249 the purported absence of any relationship between CSC and
any issuer by itself, would not sufficiently dispose of any subtle hazards. The
Supreme Court in Schwab reasoned that trading "only as an agent" did not
implicate the subtle hazards of underwriting because an agent's "assets are
not subject to the vagueries of the securities market." 250 In Schwab, the
Court used trading "only as an agent" of a customer merely as a description
of the discount brokerage services at issue. 251 This is functionally equivalent
to the NatWest phraseology of having no "relationship with any issuer. "252
The Schwab Court did not use this description of the discount brokerage
services at issue as a reason for denying the existence of any subtle
hazards. 2 3 The Schwab Court's express limitation of its holding to discount
brokerage services, exclusive of investment advisory services, 254 is consistent
with this interpretation. Furthermore, if trading only as an agent explained
the absence of subtle hazards in Schwab, then Judge Bork is correct that
subtle hazards analysis is superfluous; but the Schwab Court did not over-
turn .subtle hazards analysis. The Court did not hold that trading as an
agent in all contexts never implicates any subtle hazards.255 Instead, the real
reason the Court found discount brokerage services (or trading only as an
agent) not to implicate subtle hazards was that the broker's profits did not
vary with the performance of particular securities.256 When Judge Bork
247. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 633 (1971).
248. Nat West, 821 F.2d at 817.
249. Id.
250. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Schwab), 468
U.S. 207, 220-21 (1984).
251. Id.
252. 821 F.2d at 814, 817.
253. 468 U.S. at 220-21.
254. Id. at 221.
255. Id. at 220-21.
256. Id. at 220.
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used brokerage services as a talisman to automatically negate the subtle
hazards previously identified with investment advisory services, 217 he begged
the question whether anything implicates a subtle hazard when it is com-
bined with brokerage services. The NatWest court did not support its as-
sumption that subtle hazards analysis would not distinguish discount
brokerage services and combined brokerage and advisory services.2 5 The
absence of a relationship with any issuer does not explain why Nat West does
not implicate the promotional incentives of investment banking.
259
4. NatWest's Profits and Subtle Hazards
The Nat West court attempted to buttress the argument that subtle
hazards only result from underwriting with the real reason the Schwab
Court found no subtle hazards for discount brokerage services: "Schwab's
profits" depended "solely on the volume of shares" it traded "and not on the
purchase or sale of particular securities. '26' Thus, in NatWest, Judge Bork
appeared to make the same analysis when he stated that "CSC's profits will
depend on the volume of shares it trades and not on the sale of particular
securities ... because CSC will receive a commission only on transactions it
executes, regardless of whether CSC advised the customer to purchase the
security or whether the customer followed that advice."'261  Essentially,
Judge Bork stated that all of CSC's profits will result from its brokerage
services, and none of CSC's profits will result from its investment advisory
services, because CSC's profits result solely from commissions on brokerage
transactions.
First, Judge Bork ignored the Investment Company Institute distinction
between investment advisory services in the closed-end investment company
and open-end investment company contexts with respect to this subtle haz-
ard: "the fee of the advisor to a mutual fund [open-end investment com-
pany] increases with . .. the sale of the company's shares" whereas the
"advisory fee ... to a closed-end investment company increases only if the
value of the investment portfolio increases." '26 2 Instead of arguing that
Schwab completely disposed of this subtle hazard in NatWest, the court
257. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 67
(1981); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (NatWest), 821
F.2d 810, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-
562).
258. 821 F.2d at 815-18.
259. Id. at 817.
260. 468 U.S. at 220.
261. 821 F.2d at 817.
262. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 65-
68 & n.40 (1981); NatWest, 821 F.2d at 813-14, 817.
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should have used the Investment Company Institute distinction to question
the assumption of the Board that this particular subtle hazard did not arise
in NatWest. This is particularly the case because the NatWest application
for investment advisory services did not limit the affiliate to the closed-end
investment company activity of the Investment Company Institute
holding. 263
Second, the assumption that the factual context of brokerage plus invest-
ment advisory services in NatWest was the same as the discount brokerage
services in Schwab was questionable from another standpoint. If, in fact,
CSC's profits result exclusively from its brokerage commissions and not
from its investment advisory services, then CSC would not qualify as an
investment advisor under section 2(a)(20) of the Investment Company
Act.2" Section 2(a)(20)(iii) specifically excludes from its definition of invest-
ment advisor any "company furnishing such services at cost."'265 However,
NatWest's application stated that CSC would act as an investment adviser
under section 2(a)(20).2 66 Therefore, CSC would indeed profit from its in-
vestment advisory services, exclusive of its brokerage services. In addition,
the notion that CSC's profits or financial incentives resulted only from bro-
kerage services2 67 was further belied by the fact that "CSC would charge
separate fees for investment advice and brokerage services upon request of a
customer. ' '268 To argue that the billing practice of combining these fees co-
ordinated the facts of NatWest with the facts of Schwab would argue form
over substance.
E. Union of Powers and Subtle Hazards Analyses
The Camp Court specifically introduced subtle hazards analysis in a union
of powers context, where separately legal activities were found to nonethe-
less become illegal when combined because their combination implicated
subtle hazards. 269 Therefore, when the NatWest court first argued that sepa-
rately legal activities, such as investment advisory services and brokerage
services, remained legal when combined together, it assumed that no subtle
hazards existed. If the Nat West court truly adhered to the substance and not
merely the form of Camp to Schwab subtle hazards analysis, it could not
263. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 813-14, 817.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 80-2(20) (1982).
265. Id.; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
266. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 811 & n.3.
267. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 67
& n.40 (1981).
268. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 812; see also National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 585.
269. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1971).
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expressly deny, as it did, the Camp Court's union of powers premise for its
introduction of subtle hazards analysis. The union of powers rationale and
subtle hazards analysis were so inherently linked together that, to ignore
union of powers while purporting to engage in subtle hazards analysis, and
then to later deny the viability of subtle hazards analysis, engaged in a circu-
lar argument against the viability of both. NatWest essentially assumed that
there were no subtle hazards because the union of powers analysis could be
ignored;170 conversely, it also assumed that union of powers analysis could
be ignored because there were no subtle hazards to a combination of legal
activities.271 A further 'inductive leap that such circular reasoning encour-
ages is that the absence of any subtle hazards in the particular union of pow-
ers context of Nat West implies that there will never be any subtle hazards in
any other union of powers contexts. Thus, by merely inventing new services
and combinations of services,2 72 the denial of union of powers and subtle
hazards would safely limit the scope of Glass-Steagall prohibitions to those
services expressly prohibited by the 1933 statute. This in effect would roll
back or repeal the Glass-Steagall Act by freezing it in time.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the absolute prohibition of bank holding company involvement in
specified securities services under Glass-Steagall may be crumbling away,
some form of regulation premised on the policy concerns behind Glass-Stea-
gall should remain. Subtle hazards analysis has formed the rubric for articu-
lating the policy concerns behind the Glass-Steagall Act. Consequently,
subtle hazards and union of powers analysis have often served as the vehicles
for testing the adequacy of regulatory restrictions premised on Glass-Stea-
gall concerns within the framework of the BHCA. Current legislative re-
form efforts that would generally authorize the security activities proscribed
under the Glass-Steagall Act to bank holding companies have used excep-
tions, arguably premised on these same subtle hazards, to limit the scope of
the proposed general authorization to engage in underwriting.
The NatWest court's attempt to undermine subtle hazards analysis by fo-
270. NatWest, 821 F.2d at 813-17.
271. Id.
272.
However, critical terms of the Glass-Steagall Act are not precise, and, in practice,
there is no consensus on exactly what it permits or prohibits, particularly for com-
mercial banks .... A number of financial services firms now are able to offer fully
integrated commercial and investment banking services by creatively combining
products and services.
R.L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks to the House Subcomm. on Telecommu-
nications and Finance 2, 4 (Oct. 14, 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
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cusing exclusively on statutory construction of the Glass-Steagall Act is a
movement in the wrong direction. The statutory landscape may change, but
the policy issues persist. NatWest gets lost in the statutory landscape of the
1933 prohibitory language of the Glass-Steagall Act, while ignoring and dis-
torting the subtle hazards policy issues behind it. The subtle hazards policy
concerns are more relevant to the regulatory orientation today than exercises
in narrowing or broadening the literal construction of underwriting prohib-
ited by the 1933 Act. Glass-Steagall as a prohibitory mechanism may be
dead, but its widow, subtle hazards, remains, even if it changes its name.
John C. Anderson

